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Abstract
The risk of loses of income and productive means due to adverse weather associated to climate change can significantly differ
between farmers sharing a productive landscape. It is important to learn more about how farmers react to different levels of risk,
under measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty. Moreover, the costs associated to investments in reduced vulnerability to
climatic events are likely to exhibit economies of scope. We explore these issues using a framed field experiment that captures
realistically the main characteristics of production, and the likely weather related loses of premium coffee farmers in Tarrazu,
Costa Rica. Given that the region recently was severely hit by an extreme, albeit very infrequent, climatic event, we expected to
observe, and found high levels of risk aversion, but we do observe farmers making trade offs under different risk levels. Although
hard to disentangle at first sight given the high level of risk aversion, we find that farmer’s opt more frequently for safe options in
a setting characterized by unknown risk. Finally, we find that farmers to a large extent are able to coordinate their decisions in
order to achieve a lower cost of adaptation, and that communication among farmers strongly facilitates coordination.

JEL codes: C93, D81, H41, Q16, Q54

Keywords: Risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, technology adoption, climate change, field
experiment.

Acknowledgments: We have received valuable comments from Olof Johansson-Stenman and Maria Claudia Lopez.
Financial support from Sida to the Environmental Economics Unit at Göteborg University and to the Environment
for Development Center at CATIE is gratefully acknowledged.
a
Environment for Development Center, Tropical Agricultural and Higher Education Center (CATIE), 7170,
Turrialba, Costa Rica. Tel: + 506 2558 2215, e-mail: falpizar@catie.ac.cr
b
Department of Economics, Göteborg University, Box 640, SE-40530 Göteborg, Sweden. Tel: + 46 31 7864174, email: Fredrik.Carlsson@economics.gu.se
c
Environment for Development Center, Tropical Agricultural and Higher Education Center (CATIE), 7170,
Turrialba, Costa Rica. Tel: + 506 2558 2379, e-mail: mnaranjo@catie.ac.cr

1

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 470 [2010]

1. Introduction
There is an extensive literature on the effects of climate change on agriculture (see e.g. Adams,
1989; Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Schlenker et al., 2005). The early literature predicted very large
costs, but these estimates were criticized for ignoring the possibility of adaptation. The IPCC
(2007) defines adaptation as “the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities.” From a farmers perspective climate change can be seen as a technology shock,
whose potentially negative effects can be moderated by adapting its production function in
anticipation to the new reality. There is an extensive literature on agricultural technology
adoption in developing countries. A lot of attention has been put on explaining why the adoption
rates have been so low in these countries; see Feder et al. (1985) for a survey. A number of
explanations have been put forward including credit constraints, social networks, and tenure
insecurity.
In this paper, we are interested in three aspects of adaptation to climate change. First, we
want to investigate the effect of the level of the risk of income losses due to climate change on
farmers’ willingness to adapt. Second, we want to explore if farmers are ambiguity averse and if
that can explain adaptation behavior. Third, we want to know if and to what extent farmers are
able to coordinate their adaptation efforts, if there are economies of scope in costs.
Risk and risk aversion are likely to be important factors for the farmer’s choice of
production technology and inputs. In the case of climate change, the major change in risk is the
increased climatic variability and the increased risk of large losses due to extreme weather and
flooding. In order to investigate the role of risk and risk aversion on the farmer’s likelihood of
adapting to climate change we use a framed field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004),
conducted with small-scale coffee farmers in Costa Rica. In the experiment, farmers are asked to
act as if the decisions reflect their actual behavior, and the experiment involved real monetary
pay-offs. The experiment is similar to a standard risk experiment such as in Holt and Laury
(2002). Previous risk experiments with farmers in developing countries include, for example
Binswanger (1980), Binswanger and Sillers (1983), and Wik et al. (2004). In our case the
experiment is framed and the values are chosen to make it a decision whether to adapt to climate
change or not. We want to test the effect of the risk of income losses on adaptation behavior.
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There are several reasons for using a framed field experiment instead of using actual
production data (see e.g. Antle, 1987, 1989; Pope and Just, 1991; Chavas and Holt, 1996). First,
with actual production data it is difficult to disentangle adaptation due to changes in risk and risk
perception from other reasons such as changes in soil fertility, or new market opportunities.
Second, it is not clear whether farmers actually are aware of changes in climate over time due to
global warming, as opposed to the usual climatic variability. Thirdly, climate change might bring
about production conditions, particularly for extreme events, that have no historical parallel.
In addition to risk aversion, some authors argue that ambiguity aversion is a key factor
hindering the adoption of new technology. In economics, the interest in unmeasurable
uncertainty1 or ambiguity was spurred by the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). A number of
experimental studies have shown that people are ambiguity averse; see e.g. Fox and Tversky
(1995), Moore and Eckel (2006), Slovic and Tversky (1974). For development of theories of
ambiguity aversion see for example Gajdos et al. (2008) and Klibanoff et al. (2005). With
ambiguity aversion we mean that there is a preference for known over unknown risks.2 In the
case of technology adoption, the status quo is perceived as one where the level of uncertainty is
known to the agent given her experience with the old technology. On the other hand, the benefits
of the new technology in good or bad scenarios are ambiguous, leading agents to reject it in favor
of the old one. In simple terms, the status quo is perceived as a safe, known bet. A recent paper
that uses this setting is Engle-Warnick et al. (2007) that conduct a field experiment on coffee
farmers in Peru.
In the context of climate change and technology adoption, both the status quo (no
adaptation) and the new state (adaptation) could be characterized by both risk and ambiguity.
Climate change is a complex phenomenon, and the estimates of for example future increases in
temperature or the likelihood of extreme events are very uncertain. The risks associated with not
adapting to climate change could therefore be described as unknown or unmeasurable. If farmers
are ambiguity averse, they would then be more likely to adapt to climate change when the risk of
a disaster is unknown to them compared to a similar situation with a known risk. In the
experiment, we will test the effect of unknown risk on adaptation behavior.

1

Knight (1921) distinguished between measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty.
Klibanoff et al (2005) defines ambiguity aversion as a preference for situations that exhibit less uncertainty about
the underlying probabilities: “[…]an aversion to mean preserving spreads in the induced distribution of expected
utilities […].” (p. 1852).
2
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There is one other aspect that we investigate: the capacity and willingness of farmers to
coordinate in pursuit of lower adaptation costs. The cost of technology adoption is potentially a
function of the behavior of others. One important reason is learning from others (Bandeira and
Rasul, 2006; Besley and Case, 1993). Another reason is that the costs and benefit of a technology
might actually depend on how many farmers buy and use the technology due to economies of
scope. This makes the adaptation decision a public good, since the value depends on how many
people that adopt (Dybvig and Spatt, 1983). This opens the door for government intervention; for
example, Dybvig and Spatt (1983) suggest insuring early adopters against the possibility that
others do not adopt. In our experiment, we design a situation where the cost of technology
adoption is lower if everybody in the group adopts. However, players will face different risks,
and ultimately have different utility functions. This means that the decision can be viewed as a
coordination game, where there could be multiple equilibrium (see for example Ochs, 1995;
Cooper et al., 1999).
Depending on a number of factors, including the physical and social distance between
farmers, and the quality of the institutions, farmers will be more or less able to communicate with
each other in pursuit of reduced costs as described above. It is then important to differentiate
between situations were coordination is possible with and without communication. Experimental
evidence points consistently to the fact that communication leads to increased cooperation and
hence higher payoffs in common pool resource and public good settings (Cardenas et al., 2004;
Ledyard, 1995; Sally 1995). Moreover, studies also show that the link is not unequivocal, as
players might react negatively if they identify non-cooperating behavior in the course of group
discussions. Some explanations for the effect of communication on group decisions include
persuasion, verbal promises in a trusting environment, creation of a group identity that favors
cooperation, and improved understanding of the game; see for example Buchan et al. (2006),
Bochet et al. (2006), and Bochet and Putterman (2008). Ostrom et al (1994) stress the latter
motive, which is likely to play a larger role when the context of the experiment is increasingly
complicated due to group size, task at hand, level of education, and field experimental conditions.
In the experiment we investigate the extent at which farmers adapt a new technology when there
are economies of scope in the adaptation cost. This is done with and without communication
between the players. We also investigate conduct treatments with and without communication
when there are no strategic reasons for communication, in order to isolate any learning effect.

4
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information
on our sample and on the study area where the experiment was conducted. Section 3 introduces
the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes
the paper.

2. Description of sample and study area
The experiment was conducted with coffee producers in the high altitude mountains and valleys
of the Tarrazu region of Costa Rica. All coffee producers are organized in a cooperative, which
provided our sampling frame. This organizational setting is quite common in the country, since
membership to a cooperative allows them to share the costs of coffee milling, and gain better
access to commercialization chains. Still, individual farmers are completely free to make
decisions on their land. The Tarrazu region is well known for its premium quality gourmet coffee,
which results from the mix of high altitude, cold weather, and lots of sun. According to a census
of coffee producers (ICAFE-INEC, 2007), there are 672 coffee farmers in Tarrazu; notably these
make 75% of all farms in the region. Average farm size is 9.8 ha, but 56% of all the farms are
smaller than 5 ha. Almost all of the farmers own their land, and in 2006 only 16% had
outstanding loans on their land. This gives a picture of a prosperous region that has an equal
distribution of income, but at the same time is highly vulnerable to changes in the profits of their
land -- since farms are small, profits generally are just enough to cover the household’s day-today expenses. The possibility of finding work outside the farm is limited, given that 84% of the
farmers have only basic or no education.
In early 2008, the tropical storm Alma hit the region with full force. The occurrence of
extreme events in this region is very rare, given that it faces the Pacific Ocean. Based on
historical records starting in 1949, there have been only five extreme events coming near to the
Pacific coast of Costa Rica, and Alma was the one that came nearest to the country and furthest
south (IMN, 2008). Only in two occasions, extreme climatic events originating in the Pacific
Ocean have seriously affected the Central American region, one in 2005 and Alma in 2008. The
Tarrazu regions was one of the most heavily affected, with approximately 12% of all coffee
plants being lost.
In total, 211 farmers participated in our experiment. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics
for the Tarrazu region based on the coffee census and for our sample.

5
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Table 1. Background statistics of the sampled farmers and regional
census data, standard errors in parentheses.
Population
42

Average age in years
Male head of household
Education
(None/Basic/High School/Univ)
Number of soil conservation
practices at farm level

68%
6% / 78% / 8% / 3%
1.77

Sample
43.3
(15.6)
69%
7% / 74% / 14% / 4%
2.47
(1.42)

Source: Own estimations based on coffee census (ICAFE, 2007)

As can be seen from Table 1, our sample is highly representative of the coffee farmers in this
cooperative.

3. Description of the experiment
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment had 9 rounds in total, which were needed to test our hypotheses and also test for
order effects. Since we reveal previously hidden information after round 4, we were only able to
have an in-built test for order effects by altering the sequence of the last 5 rounds. Table 2 reports
all nine rounds, and the first column reports the two sequences of treatments.3 Subjects always
played in groups of three, clearly identified as farmer A, B or C.
Table 2. Complete design and in-built test for order effects
Round
1
2
3
4
5/7
6
7/5
8/9
9/8

Risk (%) for farmers
A/B/C
1/5/10
5/10/1
10/1/5
Unknown
1/1/1
1/5/10
1/5/10
1/5/10
1/5/10

Information
about neighbors
No information
No information
No information
n.a.
Information
Information
Information
Information
Information

Gains to perfect
coordination
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes, costs reduced 50%
Yes, costs reduced 50%
No

Communication
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

3

Henceforth we will use the first order when referring to the design of the experiment. Notably, we find no
significant order effects.
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Risk and ambiguity aversion
Rounds 1 to 3 are essentially a standard risk experiments. Risk levels (1, 5 and 10%) were chosen
to be realistic based on expert advice, and then validated with pilot studies. In our context where
decisions are made annually, a 1% risk level means that farmers might face an extreme event
once every hundred years. Historical data show the occurrence of extreme events in this region is
indeed extremely rare. We explicitly told them to consider their group members as neighbors, but
at this stage asked for no interaction between the three players. We did not give them any
information about the risk level of the other group members. Farmers were also told that their
annual profits in the case of no extreme event were 500,000 colones (approximately US$10004),
and in the case of an extreme event affecting his land, profits would be 50,000 colones per year.
The annual cost of investing in adaptation practices was 200,000 colones. We actually made a
point of making sure that all these numbers correspond to the reality of coffee farming in the
Tarrazu Region, using a representative hectare of land. It is important to stress that the Tarrazu
Region uses a high productivity, conventional production technology, and the soil conservation
practices required to adapt to climate change are not part of this technological package. Farmers
normally would not spend their capital and labor in these practices.

Round 4 was identical to the previous except that now we introduced uncertainty about the risk
level. We told all group members that “you do not know your own risk or the risk of the others.
The only thing you know is that your risk could be 1, 5 or 10 out of 100. We do not know your
level of risk either.” We then proceeded to explain that at the end we would randomly determine
which level of risk would apply for payment. Strictly, the risk is not unknown here, so this is
sometimes called a situation of weak ambiguity. The main reason why we opted for this approach
was to avoid subjects believing that the experiment was rigged by the researchers. Thus, it was
clear to the participants that we did not have more information about the risk than what they had.
The payoff of a farmer facing the weakly ambiguous situation in our experiment is then
determined by two known probabilities. The first one relates to the risk level that each farmer will
ultimately face. In our case, the risk could take any of three values with equal probability. The
second one refers to the probabilities of an extreme event, which in our case are 1, 5 and 10%.
Hence, the expected risk is 5.3%. We therefore compare the share of subjects adapting when the
4

At the time of the experiment 1 USD = 500 colones.
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risk is known and equal to 5% with the share of subject adapting when the risk is unknown but
the expected value is 5.3%. Strictly we should have used other probabilities since the expected
value is not exactly 5%. However, we wanted to keep the probabilities as simple as possible.
Table 3 summarizes the design of the first four rounds.

Table 3. Risk and ambiguity treatments.
Risk levels5

Adapt
(safe option)

1%
5%
10%
Unknown (between
1 and 10%)

300,000
300,000
300,000
300.000

Not adapt (risky option)
Bad outcome
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000

Good outcome
500,000
500,000
500,000
500,000

Degree of risk aversion if indifferent

3.4
2.25
1.75
If indifferent between unknown and
risk of 5%, then ambiguity neutral

In Round 5, all farmers faced a risk level of 1%. This round was designed as a first introduction
to information about the risk of the other farmers in the group We then tested for differences
between this treatment in order 1 (round 5) and order 2 (round 7) and found no significant
differences in the distribution of the responses using a Chi-square test (p-value = 0.828).

Gains to coordination and communication
Finally, Rounds 6 to 9 were designed to test the effect of potential gains of adaptation
coordination and the role of communication in increasing the likelihood of coordination. In all
these four rounds, Farmers A, B and C faced a risk level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively, and this
information was known to all players. We did this in order to reduce the informational
differences between treatments with and without communication. In Round 7, after stressing that
they all had different risk levels, and that extreme events could affect one farmer and not the
others, we told them “if the three of you decide to adapt, the cost of adaptation is 100,000
colones. If less than three of you decide to adapt, then the cost of adaptation is the same as
before, that is 200,000 colones.” Do note that at this stage we are still not allowing any
interaction between the players, so that Rounds 6 and 7 differ only in the potentially reduced
adaptation costs. Round 8 is identical to Round 7 but now we finally allowed for interaction
between the three group members, which allows us to test for the role of communication when

5

Farmers faced all risk levels in one round or the other of the first 3 rounds
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there are gains to coordination.. Finally in, rounds 6 and 9 there are no gains to coordination and
hence no strategic reason for changing behavior in round 9 as a result of communication. Hence
our two-by-two design allows us to isolate the use of communication as a way of gaining a better
understanding of the experiment (in round 9) from using communication as a tool for
coordination.

3.2 Experimental procedure
The cooperative in Tarrazu organizes yearly meetings with all its members, grouped in 11
villages. We used those meetings to invite farmers to our experiments (called workshops). The
invitation was done jointly with the cooperative, and included information about the date, time
and place of our workshops in each of the communities. We also mentioned that we were hoping
to learn from their experience of a changing climate, and that they would have the opportunity to
participate in a set of activities in which they could earn some money, depending on their
decisions as farmers. A detachable slip was to be returned to us, where name, telephone number,
and location were filled by the farmer. We followed up this invitation with phone calls
confirming their interest in participating. This strategy is not different from the one used by the
cooperative to call for their own meetings. In total, we handed out 434 invitations and received
397 expressions of interest, i.e. slips with contact details.
A team of three highly trained field experimenters conducted all the work. Farmers were let
into the room when they arrived and were randomly assigned as farmers A, B or C in chairs
arranged in groups of three. We made sure that people coming together did not form part of the
same group. After a prudent lapse of time, we closed the chairs available to subjects, and late
comers were allowed only as observers at the back of the room.
After welcoming the subjects and telling them about the purpose of the workshop, we
explained that the experiment was going to last two hours, and reassured them about the
confidentially of their individual responses. At this time we allowed people to leave if they chose
to do so, but extremely few took this option and only due to lack of time. We also requested that
there should be no interaction between subjects until we specifically allowed them to
communicate.
We then explained the main aspects of the experiment. We introduced the notion of climate
change and most importantly described the different possibilities available to farmers as

9
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adaptation to climate change strategies. At all times we kept a neutral perspective concerning the
need to invest in adaptation. We did mention that a change in precipitation and temperature, as
well as in the frequency of extreme events, could negatively affect their profitability due to
increased erosion, reduced soil fertility, and in the worst case, extreme losses like the ones
experience during the tropical storm Alma. Obviously, this was nothing new to the farmers.
One of the main aspects at this stage was to explain risk to the farmers. We used visual aids
depicting combinations of hundred red and white dots equivalent to 0, 1, 5 and 10%. These visual
representations of risk were available at all times. A tombola with 100 red and white balls was
also used, mainly to relate the risk charts with the number of balls in the tombola and eventually
to our payment strategy. Throughout this presentation we stressed that risk could differ between
neighbors and that the occurrence of an event was independent for all subjects. Several trials
were done until all questions were evacuated.
The actual experiment started with an explanation of the setting. We told them that we
wanted to learn about their decisions as farmers in nine subsequent rounds, and that at the end of
the experiment we would pay them according to their decisions. We stressed that they should
regard their group members as neighbors. At this stage subjects were asked to open a booklet
containing an example sheet, nine decision sheets, i.e. one for each round, and an exit survey.
The pages were stapled such that they could not browse forward in the booklet. The example
sheet included in Annex 1 was used to explain the basics of the 9 rounds. At this stage, we
introduced the payoffs and walked each farmer neutrally through the decision whether to invest
or not. Again we used the tombola to show them how their payment was going to be determined
according to their risk.
Finally we proceeded to explain the payment method, which is quite standard for this type
of experiments. First of all, we told them that one of the nine rounds was going to be randomly
selected for a real payment.6 Also, given our budget limitations, we explained that an exchange
rate of one in thousand was going to be used, but asked them to focus on the per hectare payoffs
that corresponded with their reality as coffee producers. Notably, even our converted payment
exceeded a one day worth of salary in a coffee farm, clearly enough to achieve saliency. Before
starting the experiment we conducted several example payments to show both how we were

6

Later in the experiment, we explained that, for Round 4 with ambiguous risk, a further random selection of risk was
needed.
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going to pay but also to make it very clear that they were playing for real money. Note that all the
realizations of the risks and the outcomes were make after all nine rounds had been played.
The following is the actual translated script read for Round 1. The actual decision sheets
were similar to the example sheet provided in Annex 1, so the script served to guide subjects
through the details of the round. Small variations in this script were needed in the rest of the
rounds.

Figure 1. Translated script for round 1
CASE 1: In this case the question is whether you choose to invest or not in adaptation, given the level of risk shown
in your sheet. As visual help, you can see in this slide the possible risk levels you can face. [PUT SLIDE WITH 3
RISK LEVELS]
- If you choose to invest in adaptation, your profit is [₡300.000] independently of the level of risk.
- If you choose not to invest in adaptation, your profit will depend on the risk of a natural disaster, as
described in your sheet
You do not know the level of risk of other farmers. This risk could be higher or lower than yours. The other farmers
do not know your risk either. Also please remember that what happens to you will not necessarily happen to the
others. In practice this means that each one of you separately will draw a ball from the tombola to determine what
happens to your farm. As mentioned before, the number of red balls in the tombola depends on your own risk. In
some cases, there will be 5 red balls, others might have just 1 and for some there will be 10 red balls in the tombola.
Please check carefully your level of risk. Will you choose to adapt or not, given that level of risk.
Do not forget that you do not know the risk of the other farmers, and that each case is a new situation that has no
relation to the previous. Please do not talk to each other. Do you have nay question? [WAIT] Please mark your
decision in the corresponding box.

4. Results
A total of 211 observations were gathered in the 11 workshops. The following results explore our
two main research questions: (i) risk and ambiguity aversion, and (ii) to what extent farmers can
coordinate their adaptation decision to reduce costs, and the importance of communication. For
the first issue, we conduct our analysis based on individual observations, and for the second issue
the relevant unit of observation is group decisions.

4.1 Risk and ambiguity aversion
We begin by looking at how farmers behave at various levels of risk of having their crops
destroyed by extreme weather associated to climate change. At this stage of the experiment, the
farmers did not know the level of risk of the other participants. Each farmer made the decision to
adapt or not for three risk levels. A number of farmers were inconsistent in the sense that they
adapt at a low, but not at a high, level of risk. In total, 17% of the farmers were inconsistent. At

11
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this stage of the analysis, we remove inconsistent farmers, and are left with 175 observations. In
Table 4 the number and share of farmers adapting and not adapting at the three different levels of
risks are presented.
Table 4. Number of farmers not adapting and adapting under various levels of risk
Risk of crops

Degree of relative risk

Not adapt

Adapt

destroyed

aversion if indifferent

1%

3.4

120 (69%)

55 (31%)

5%

2.25

40 (23%)

135 (77%)

10%

1.75

9 (5%)

166 (95%)

P-value of chi-square test of difference in distribution between risk levels = 0.000

As expected, the share of farmers adapting increases as the level of risk increases, and the
differences in shares are significant using a Chi-square test. The degree of relative risk aversion,
assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function which is only a function of the pay-off,
is higher than 3.4 for 31% of he subjects, and the median degree of risk aversion is between 2.25
and 3.4. Consequently, the farmers are very likely to adapt to climate change, even at relatively
low levels of risks. Still, given that our experiment took place a few weeks after the occurrence of
an extreme event as dramatic as Alma we think it is noteworthy that 69% of all farmers did not
adapt at a risk of 1%. When the risk level increased to 10%, only 5% of the subjects do not adapt.
We next investigate if farmers are ambiguity averse. This is done by comparing the shares
of subject adapting when the risk is known and when the risk is unknown. The results for the
aggregate data are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Number of farmers not adapting and adapting when the risk known and 5%, and when
the risk is unknown
Risk of crops destroyed

Not adapt

Adapt

Known risk, 5%

40 (23%)

135 (77%)

Unknown risk (between 1 and 10%)

38 (26%)

137 (74%)

P-value, chi-square test of difference in distribution between known and unknown risk = 0.797

12
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The share of subjects adapting when the risk is unknown is not significantly different
from the share when the risk is known.7 Consequently, looking at the aggregate data there is no
evidence of ambiguity aversion. One problem with our test is the high share of people adapting
even when the risk is 5%. Subjects already adapting when the risk is 5% could be adapting when
the risk is unknown but with an expected value of 5.3%, even if they are not ambiguity averse. In
Table 6 we report tests for the group of participants who only adapted when the risk was 10% or
did not adapt at all (40 out of 175 farmers).

Table 6. Number of farmers not adapting and adapting when the risk known and 5%, and when
the risk is unknown for subsample of subjects that never adapts when the risk is known or only
adapt when the risk is known and equal to 10%.
Risk of crops destroyed

Not adapt

Adapt

Known risk, 5%

40 (100%)

0 (0%)

Unknown risk (between 1 and 10%)

18 (45%)

22 (55%)

P-value, chi-square test of difference in distribution between known and unknown risk = 0.001

By construction, none of these farmers adapted when the risk is 5%. However when they
faced the ambiguous situation (with an expected risk of 5.33%), 55% of them adapted. The
difference in the share of farmers adapting is highly significant, suggesting that a large share of
these farmers actually are ambiguity averse. Or differently put, the fact that the risk is unknown
induces more adaptation than the corresponding situation with known risk.
Finally we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if the farmer
decides to adapt. We do this in order to explore the effect of socioeconomic characteristics as
reported at the exit survey completed by all subjects. Treatment effects are included as dummy
variables (we use the 5% as the baseline risk level). The results are shown in Table 7, standard
errors have been corrected clustering.

7

Since we cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference, it does not matter that the expected value in the ambiguous
treatment is slightly higher than in the treatment with known risk.
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Table 7. Logit results using the 5% risk level as baseline, dependent variable is equal to one if
farmer adapts
Description (Mean)

Marginal effect

P-value

Low risk (1%)

= 1 if low risk (0.25)

-0.441

0.000

High risk (10%)

= 1 if low risk (0.25)

0.242

0.000

= 1 if ambiguity treatment (0.25)

0.012

0.757

Male

= 1 if subject is male (0.71)

0.138

0.026

Age

Age in years (43.33)

0.001

0.371

= 1 if number of hectares > 5 (0.27)

-0.129

0.032

Number of soil conservation

0.032

0.073

-0.023

0.485

Treatment characteristics

Ambiguity treatment
Subject characteristics

Big coffee farm
Previous investment in soil conservation

measures they have taken (2.46)
Losses due to Alma

= 0 if no losses, 2 if losses larger than
250 000 colones per hectare, 1
otherwise (1.81)

Number of subjects / observations

171 / 700

Pseudo-R2

0.252

Both treatment dummy variables for known risk have the expected sign and are highly
significant. The ambiguity treatment has no significant effect, as expected from the aggregate
tests conducted in Table 6. From the subject characteristics, we find that males have a
significantly higher probability of adapting, whereas age and education have no significant effect
on the behavior in the experiment. Subjects with a big coffee farm are less likely to adapt, which
could be a reflection of the fact that they have more resources to overcome adverse effects
without compromising their livelihood. Finally farmers who already invest in soil conservation
are more likely to invest in additional practices to reduce the effect of climate change on their
land.

4.2 The role of communication and cost saving coordination
In the last part four rounds of the experiment, subjects always knew their own risk and the risk of
the two other group members. The first difference between the rounds is whether subjects are
allowed to communicate or not. The second difference is whether there is an incentive to
coordinate on adaptation or not. As explained in Section 3.1, farmers were told that if all group
14
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members decide to adapt, adaptation costs would be reduced by 50%. This is indeed a realistic
situation, since there are economies of scope in the provision of technical assistance and purchase
of equipment and materials needed for the adoption of soil conservation practices. We now focus
on the decision at the group level, and not the individual farmer. For that reason, we remove
groups with less than 3 farmers, resulting in a total of 68 groups. Table 8 summarizes the
outcomes in the groups for the four treatments.
Table 8. Number of groups with different number of subjects adapting in each treatment8
Number of
subjects adapting
0
1
2
3

Treatment 6
No gains to
coordinate & no
communication
3 (4%)
11 (16%)
32 (47%)
22 (33%)

Treatment 7
Gains to
coordinate & no
communication
0 (0%)
9 (13%)
26 (38%)
33 (49%)

Treatment 8
Gains to
coordinate &
communication
1 (1%)
6 (9%)
14 (21%)
47 (69%)

Treatment 9
No gains to
coordinate &
communication
3 (4%)
11 (16%)
28 (41%)
26 (39%)

There are two interesting comparison that can be made. First we can test if the whole
distribution of the number of subject adapting in a group is different for two treatments (Chisquare test). Secondly we can test if the share of groups actually achieving full coordination in
adaptation and hence a possible cost reduction (i.e. were all three players adapt) is different for
the alternative treatments (proportion test).
To begin with, let us look at treatment 6 and 7. In both cases subjects were not allowed to
communicate, but in round 7 the adaptation costs were reduced if all adapted. There is a
significant increase (proportion test p-value = 0.055) in the share of groups where all adapt, and
hence get reduced adaptation cost, but there is no significant difference in the overall distribution.
(Chi square test p-value = 0.111). So farmers are able to coordinate only to a limited extent if
they cannot communicate with each other, and the pattern of “failed” coordination efforts is not
different in both cases. The question is what happens if we allow for communication, as in
treatment 8 (compared to 7). Communication in the pursuit of reduced adaptation costs achieves a
significant change in the distribution of responses (Chi-square test p-value = 0.053) and in 69%
of the groups all subjects adapts, thereby reaping the benefits of coordination. This share is
significantly different from the share in treatment 7 (proportion test p-value = 0.015). This result
is further strengthened if we compare treatments 8 and 9. In round 8 communications is allowed
8

Treatments 6-9, were played in different orders to test for order effects, but since we found no significant order
effects aggregate results are reported in the table.
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and if coordination is successful, will lead to reduced costs. In round 9, communication is also
allowed, but is inconsequential in terms of costs. The increase in number of groups where
everybody adapts is high and significant when cost reductions are at stake compared with no
gains to coordination (proportion test p-value = 0.001). The difference in distributions is also
significant using a chi-square test (p-value = 0.004). In order to test the effect of communication
alone, we can compare treatments 6 and 9, which are not significantly different in terms of the
distribution of responses (p-value = 0.896) or the share of groups coordinating (p-value = 0.473).
Hence communication has no effect on farmer’s decisions in the absence of further gains from
coordination. In our experimental setting, communication is thus not important in the sense of
learning and understanding the experiment, but it is important for strategic coordination reasons.

5. Discussion
Our experiment was conducted with coffee farmers in the Tarrazu region of Costa Rica, which
was heavily affected by hurricane Alma in early 2008. This type of extreme events is new to the
region, and many farmers were taken by surprise. We purposely conducted our experiment in the
region a few months after Alma. In particular, it is hard to explain to farmers that climate change
could imply a change in the pattern of extreme events when farmers have lots of prior experience
with these types of events, and it is too likely that they will disregard key experimental features.
Given that farmers in Tarrazu were well aware of the dangers of an extreme event, but at the
same time have little or no priors with respect to the likelihood of future events, we believe this
was a good setting to run risk experiments and most importantly, to test farmer’s behavior in
response to a changing climate.
As expected, we observe high levels of risk aversion, but we do observe farmers making
trade offs, and 69% do not adapt if the risk of large income losses is 1%. Hence some farmers
still do not adapt, even in the presence of the close memories of an extreme event. Furthermore,
we find evidence of a strong effect on adaptation of ambiguity aversion for the group of farmers
who did not adapt at low risk levels.
The implications for policy making of this ambiguity aversion are not straightforward, and
there is a lot of discussion particularly with respect to environmental risks, which are frequently
associated with unmeasurable uncertainty (see for example Treich 2009; Viscusi, 1998; Viscusi
and Hamilton, 1999). In the case of climate change, it is actually realistic to assume that farmers,
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climate experts, and the government do not know the risk associated to changes in climate..
Viscusi (1998) and Viscuis and Hamilton (1999) argue against “conservatism bias”. Treich 2009
discusses two implications of acting on ambiguity aversion. On the one hand, from a purely
accounting view, putting concerns for ambiguity aversion on top of risk aversion at the
government level might lead to too much protection and too much investment in avoiding certain,
unmeasurable, risks. On the other hand, peoples’ preferences could favor governmental policies
that are attentive of their aversion to ambiguous situations. Our results contribute to this
discussion by identifying that both risk and ambiguity aversion seems to be important motives
behind adaptation to climate change decisions. We found that around 50% of those who choose
not to adapt to a 5% risk when the risk was know, do adapt if the risk is ambiguous but
comparable in expected level. Consequently, ambiguity aversion is an important factor for
technology adoption decisions.
What if the government actually knows the true distribution of probabilities of different
levels of risk, and farmers exhibit ambiguity aversion? This resembles a situation where people
have biased risk perceptions: see for example Olof Johansson-Stenman (2008) for a discussion
about perceived and objective risk. From a social efficiency perspective, this might lead, in
retrospect, to too much adaptation. In that situation, it could be optimal for the government to
provide costly information to reduce the degree of ambiguity among the individuals, insurance
programs against worse case scenarios, and improved safety networks, just to mention a few
strategies to deal with the extreme negative scenario.
Finally, we also explored the role of communication and monetary incentives (in the form
of cost reducing economies of scope arising from full coordination) on the decision to adapt or
not to climate change. Monetary incentives for coordination significantly increase the degree of
adaptation, but if communication is allowed, farmers are able to coordinate more frequently in
pursuit of the reduced adaptation costs. Notably, if no financial incentives are allowed,
communication is irrelevant for the farmer’s private decision. Do note that this are experienced
farmers who make similar decisions every day, and hence are less likely to be influenced by peers
when it comes to how they run their own land.
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Annex 1. Example sheet for farmer A used to explain the experiment
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